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"What does evolution teach us about human nature? It tells us that human
nature is a superstition." (Ghiselin, 1997, 1)
1 Introduction
In this essay, I begin with an overview of a traditional account of natural kinds,
and then considerDavidHull's (1986) critiqueof species as natural kinds and the
associated notion of human nature. Second, I explore recent "liberal" accounts
of humannatureprovidedbyEdouardMachery (2008) andGrant Ramsey (2013)
and criticized by Tim Lewens (2012). They attempt to avoid the criticisms of-
fered by Hull. After examining those views, I turn to Richard Boyd's (1988; 1999)
Homeostatic Property Cluster account of natural kinds which is ﬂexible but de-
tailed enough to avoid Hull's criticisms but also those aﬀecting themore recent
views. We then consider what I call the "problem of variation." Fourth, I con-
sider two case studies -- the basic emotions and facial expressions and inbreed-
ing avoidance and incest taboos. I argue that the former is a component of a
Boydian human nature but the latter is not. The conclusion is that if there is a
human nature, it must be argued for on a case-by-case basis. And, one of most
discussed cases thought to be part of our nature is simply not.
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2 Natural Kinds and Human Nature
2.1 Hull's critique
Scientists and philosophers of science have spilt much ink on the concept of
natural kind. On a traditional view, ﬁrst, members of a natural kind share an
essence. Second, an essence is some intrinsic property such that necessarily all
and only members of that kind have that property.¹ Third, observable proper-
ties are explained by non-observable properties. The former are called a "nom-
inal essence" and the latter a "real essence." Customarily, the nominal essence
is amacrostructural property and the real essence is amicrostructural property.
A common example is the kind gold. The real essence is atomic number 79 and
the nominal essence includes its melting point of 1,948F (1,064C).
David Hull (1978) famously has argued that biological species are not natu-
ral kinds but are "individuals." An individual is a concrete particular; it is spatially
localized and its parts exhibit unique causal relations at and over time. For ex-
ample, Homo sapiens came into existence roughly 200,000 years ago and will
go extinct at some future date. However, once is it goes extinct, nomatter how
similar an organism is to us, it will not be human. Natural kinds are not like this.
Whenever something has the property atomic number 79 there is an instance
gold.² Hull oﬀered several arguments for his view.
The ﬁrst argument goes as follows. Speaking abstractly, for any kind with
respect to a possible world, there is a set associated with that kind in that pos-
¹I say property, but there could be several properties such that members and only them
have those properties.
²Philip Kitcher (1984) has challenged this claim with the following hypothetical example.
In the lizard genus Cnemidophorus several unisexual species have arisen through
hybrization. The lizard Cnemidophorus tesselatus has resulted from a cross be-
tween bisexual and unisexual species. Now suppose that C. tesselatuswas wiped
out and the parental species hybridized again creating a new population which
exhibit the samegenetic, morphological, behavior, and ecological traits. (Kitcher,
1984, 117)
Kitcher writes, "To hypothesize 'sibling species' in this case (and in like cases) seems to me not
only to multiply species beyond necessity but also to obfuscate all the biological similarities
that matter" (Kitcher, 1984, 117). But by the same reasoning, Kitcher would have taxonomists
grouporganismson thebasis of homplasies (shared characters) as opposed to synapomorphies
(sharedderived characters). Thiswould leave the "treeof life" out of classiﬁcation and is contrary
to contemporary taxonomy.
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sible world.³ This set is deﬁned by an essential property. Species evolve. Sets
are atemporal entities. Since only temporal entities evolve, species are not sets.
Therefore, species are not natural kinds.⁴ The second argument is this. Accord-
ing to the axiom of extensionality, sets that have the same members are iden-
tical. Sets diﬀer just in case they diﬀer in their members. Species can survive a
loss of an organism. However, sets cannot survive the loss of a member. Thus,
species are not sets. Therefore, they are not natural kinds. Here is the third argu-
ment. If species were spatiotemporally unrestricted classes, then there are laws
concerning species per se. But there are no such laws. Thus, species are not
spatiotemporally unrestricted classes. Therefore, species are not natural kinds.⁵
Note Hull assumes in each argument that species are either concrete particu-
lars or natural kinds. If there is a third option, then his arguments are invalid
(see Slater (2013, Ch. 5) for such an argument.).
As a corollary of his argument for species as individuals, Hull argued that is
no human nature. First, there is a synchronic problem. It is highly unlikely that
there is an property that all and only humans have at a time. Hull writes,
Generations of philosophers have argued that all human beings are
essentially the same, that is, they share the same nature.... Period-
ically a biological species might be characterized by one or more
characters which are both universally distributed among and lim-
ited to the organisms belonging to that species, but such states of
aﬀaires are temporary, contingent and relatively rare. (Hull, 1986, 3)
As evolutionary biologist ErnstMayr has argued at length, evolutionary biology
has replaced "typological thinking" with "population thinking" in which varia-
tion is the spice of life. Second, there is the diachronic problem. For any trait
(even if every human has it), evolutionary processes can remove it from the
species.
³On this view, kinds would be sets of sets. Speciﬁcally, suppose a property F is essential to
the kind. Then consider the set of objects which have F in a worldw. The set which has each for
these subsets per possible world is the kind.
⁴Kitcher (1989) has argued that sets canevolve in the following sense. Let a stageof a species
be the set of organisms alive at that time along with their frequency distribution of traits. A
species evolves then just in case there is a change in the frequency distribution of properties
between stages represented by an ordered n-tuple of stages ordered by times.
⁵Kitcher (1984) argues that there could be laws concerning a species. For example, he con-
siders a schematic law, "All S are P" where 'S' names a species and 'P' is some property essential
to being a member of S. Suppose that if a member of S lacked P they would be inviable. But
inviolable oﬀspring are still S (Sober, 1984).
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To complicatematters further, these clusters of properties, whether
uni- or multi-modal, change through time. A character state (or
allele) which is rare may become common, and one that is nearly
universal may become entirely eliminated. In short, species evolve,
and to the extent that they evolve through natural selection, both
genetic and phenotypic variation are essential. (Hull, 1986, 3)⁶
As a consequence, human nature cannot be grounded in rationality, language
deployment or acquisition, etc. since they are not essential to "parts" of H. sapi-
ens. Hull was open to the possibility that phylogenetic position in the tree of life
did provide a essence to species. Supposing species are lineages individuated
between speciation events, speciation events and extinction events, or specia-
tion events and extant taxa, then maybe such a property is essential to us as a
species.⁷
2.2 Liberalizing (liberating?) human nature
Several philosophershave reconsideredHull's critique includingMachery (2008)
and Ramsey (2013). Machery defends a nomological notion of human nature.
He writes, "According to this second notion, human nature is the set of prop-
erties that humans tend to possess as a result of the evolution of their species"
(Machery, 2008, 323). As examples of our nature, Machery suggests bipedalism,
fear of unexpected noises, and biparental care. Machery's account has several
important implications. First, our nature is not "deﬁnitional." That is, these prop-
erties, or generalizations concerning them, do not individuate our species. Sec-
ond, since our nature is not deﬁnitional, non-humansmay have generalizations
true of us, true of them. For example, biparental care is not unique to us (e.g. it
is found in tropical frogs). Third, generalizations concerning our nature may be
true of only most of us.
Machery claims that his nomological notion is immune to Hull's arguments.
First, synchronic variation is consistent with the nomological notion. Second,
⁶Evolution by natural selection requires variation; otherwise, selection cannot proceed.
Thus, if we have a unimodal distribution of a trait, evolution by natural selection has ceased.
⁷This would also explain why species names are proper names given a Kripkean theory of
reference (Kitts, 1983; Hull, 1984). Also according to Kripke, one has one's parents essentially.
Thus, given species are individuals and they have their parent species essentially, the tree of
life could not have been other than it is. Given all species descended from a common ancestor,
Creationism is false and necessarily so.
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dyachronic variation is consistent with the nomological notion. Finally, the ac-
count of humannature here is descriptive and not normative; it has no sociopo-
litical implications on its own.
Thenomological notionof humannaturehasbeen criticized in severalways.
First, as Tim Lewens (2012, 464-5) argues, the nomological notion is restricted
to generalizations that result from evolution. However, it is diﬃcult to draw a
distinction between evolution and culture. For example, proponents of gene-
culture coevolutionary theories claim learning and imitation can be sources of
evolutionary change (Boyd and Richerson, 1988). Second, Machery's nomolog-
ical notion has a problematic metaphysics. He writes,
For Aristotle, the fact that humans have the same nature explains
why many generalizations can be made about them (for a recent
development of this idea, seeWalsh, 2006). Forme, on the contrary,
the fact that many generalizations can be made about humans ex-
plain in which sense there is a human nature. (Machery, 2008, 323)
Metaphysicians, especially Humeans, claimwe explain the truth of a generaliza-
tion in terms of the particulars of which it is true. For example, if the generaliza-
tion, "For all x, if x is F, then x isG" is true, it is because "Fa" and "Ga" are true, and
"Fb" and "Gb" are true, and so on. Machery is inverting this bit of metaphysics.
Recently, Grant Ramsey (2013) has argued against Machery's view in favor
of his even more "liberal" account. First, he thinks that properties that most
humans lack can be components of human nature. He writes,
First, by requiring possession by the majority of humans, one loses
many traits characteristic of humans. Any traits (psychological, be-
havioral, morphological) that are sexually dimorphic or, say, exhib-
ited only by a particular ethnic group, will be excluded. Viviparity,
lactation, and menopause, for example, are no part of human na-
ture. (Ramsey, 2013, 985)
Vivparity, lactation, and menopause are important features of women's lives in
our species. They have evolutionary explanations. However, Ramsey is wrong
that they are "characteristic of humans." Menopause cannot be characteristic
of humans since killer and pilot whales exhibit menopause too. A trait is char-
acteristic of humans if, and only if, it is distinctive of us. It is common to claim
that since human nature does not require essential properties then human na-
ture does not require distinctive properties. Theories of human nature can give
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up essential properties but they cannot give up distinctive properties. After all,
we want to explain what makes us distinctively human.⁸ Machery makes the
same mistake since he includes traits like bipedalism as part of our nature. But
other species are bipedal; Struthio camelus otherwise known as the ostrich is.
Bipedalism is not distinctive of our species. Additionally, Ramsey (2013, 986),
with Lewens, that the distinction between evolution and culture or innate and
learned traits is unsustainable.
Ramseyoﬀers his own life-history trait cluster account of humannature. Con-
sider a humanwith a genome and in an environment with some trait at at time.
If we consider all of the traits over time with respect to their environments and
genomewe have their life-history. Moreover, we can also consider the distribu-
tion of traits of all humans with their genomes over their environments. This is
their collective life-history.
Human nature is deﬁned as the pattern of trait clusters within the
totality of extant human possible life histories. Thus, if one were to
take all of the possible life histories that form the basis for individual
nature, and then combine them, one would possess the set of life
histories that forms the basis for human nature, since the trait distri-
bution patterns in this set of life histories constitute human nature.
(Ramsey, 2013, 987)
The collective life-history described above is not yet human nature. Rather, we
must consider all of the possible traits which extant humans would have given
their genomes and environments. This proposal is problematic. First, we must
considered deceased humans as well since our evolutionary history includes
them too especially if we are interested in patterns. For example, human settle-
ment patterns can only be explained by human migrations taking us for back
into the past. Second, we need to determine what the notion of possibility is
here. Is it logical, nomological, or technological possibility? With no constraints,
we can at most draw a blank at this space of possibility. Ramsey is aware of this
worry (Ramsey, 2013, 988-9). He stresses scientists are interestedpatterns in life-
histories. He provides an example. Social scientists are interested in whether a
⁸Suppose Hull is right that there are no intrinsic properties are essential for being human.
That is, for any property you pick -- bipedalism, big brain, language, etc. -- it is possible for a
human to lack them. From this it does not follow that there are not nomologically necessary
properties of humans. Hull's own view is that there might be extrinsic essential properties of
being human such as having the parents we qua species.
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child who is abused will be aggressive towards their own children. They are in-
terested in the prevalence of a trait; what proportion of children are abused?
And, they are interested in the robustness of the association between traits;
what proportion of children abused are aggressive towards their children? This
concerns the actual abuse and aggression and has little to do with the merely
possible.
I think that Machery and Ramsey are right that Hull's criticisms do not chal-
lenge more liberal views of human nature. First, human nature need not be
deﬁnitional. Second, following Lewens and Ramsey, our nature need not be the
product of evolution alone. However, like Lewens and Hull, I ammore skeptical
of human nature because of data. Speciﬁcally, when we look at traits consid-
ered as classic examples of human nature we ﬁnd a mixed bag. Before we turn
to that, I want to sketch a diﬀerent approach, which I think is better than the
nomological and life-history views.
2.3 Boyd's alternative
Over the last three decades, Richard Boyd (1988; 1999) has oﬀered an alterna-
tive account of natural kinds. Natural kinds are homeostatic property clusters.
First, they are families of co-occurring properties that result in a sort of home-
ostasis. Second, homeostasis occurs because either the properties in the family
are causally related, or they result from a common cause. Third, we explain our
successful projections and inductions by reference to HPC kinds. What mat-
ters is not whether all and onlymembers of a kind have some property, but this
property causally covaries withmembers of that kind.⁹ This too is a "liberalized"
view of kinds. Boyd argues species might be natural kinds, though we do not
have to follow him here. Additionally, a Boydian HPC kind approach oﬀers the
possibility of a human nature. It is this possibility that we will explore in this
essay.
In order to ﬂesh out this Boydian alternative, here is some terminology with
speciﬁc reference to biology (c.f. Wilson et al. (2007)).
• Nominal essence: Properties of a taxa that covary which may be directly
causally related.
⁹On Boyd's view, a property may be essential to a kind evenwhenmembers lack it and non-
members have it. Given his theory of reference, wemistakenly thought 'essence' mean "neces-
sary and suﬃcient" but it what be it actually means is "causally covaries with."
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• Real essence: Properties of a taxa on which the nominal essence causally
depend.
• Phylogenetic position: Properties that individuate a taxa's phylogenetic
position (e. g. branching and extinction events).
Boyd's account is superior to Machery's and Ramsey's. First, like their views, it
need not assume that human nature is deﬁnitional because we need not think
species are HPC kinds themselves. Second, it is superior in that it providesmore
structure than theirs. It incorporates the notion of homeostatic property clus-
ters and thus causal covariationmaking room for nomologically necessary traits
for human nature. Third, it is superior since it need not assume real essences are
evolutionary and nominal essences are cultural. If Lewens and Ramsey are cor-
rect thatnodistinctioncanbemadebetweenevolution/cultureor innate/learned,
it can accommodate this.
2.4 The problem of variation
Wecannowstate theproblemofvariation. If humannature consists inHPCkinds
associated with our species, then there are property clusters that overlap with
H. sapiens. Moveover, these property clusters are no more inclusive and no less
inclusive than our species. Suppose we have a property cluster more inclusive
than just our species. Then, it will not provide a human nature. Suppose we
have a property cluster which is less inclusive than our species. Then, it again it
will not be a human nature. In this essay, I consider two examples. The ﬁrst ex-
ample concerns the basic emotions and facial expressions. I argue that is plau-
sibly is an HPC kind. That is, the basic emotions provide a real essence of which
facial expressions are a nominal essence. They causally covary just as we would
expect on a Boydian approach. However, I argue that our second example is
not an HPC kind. Inbreeding avoidance is a trait that is found in primates more
generally and not just in humans.¹⁰ Likewise, incest taboos are absent in many
human societies, and in societies where they exist they vary in who counts as
kin. Thus, even if inbreeding avoidance is an HPC kind, it is too general for a
human nature, and incest taboos, even if they are HPC kinds, are too speciﬁc for
a human nature.
¹⁰It is found in other species too, but I focus here on primates.
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3 Case Studies
3.1 Basic emotions and facial expressions
Consider a sad face. When sad, we angle upward the inner corners of our eye-
brows; our lips are stretched horizontally with the lower lip pushed up and cor-
ners pulled down; our checks are raised and our eyelids droop. In the 1970s,
psychologists Paul Ekman and Walter Friesen (1971) showed expressive pho-
tos to the non-westernized Fore of New Guinea (189 adults and 130 children).
Subjects were shown three pictures with an associated story andwere asked to
pick the face that ﬁt the story. It is worth noting that a Fore and a westerner
interviewed subjects where the former recruited and read the story. The Fore
members were told there was no correct answer and their readings were back-
translated. Western members also averted their eyes during the reading. The
stories provided were these:
• Happiness: His (her) friends have come, and he (she) is happy.
• Sadness: His (her) child (mother) has died, and he (she) feels very sad.
• Anger: He (she) is angry; or he (she) is angry, about to ﬁght.
• Surprise: He (she) is just now looking at some thing new and unexpected
• Disgust: He (she) is looking at something he (she) dislikes; or He (she) is
looking at something which smells bad.
• Fear: He (she) is sitting in his (her) house all alone, and there is no one
else in the village. There is no knife, axe, or bow and arrow in the house.
A wild pig is standing in the door of the house, and the man (woman) is
looking at the pig and is very afraid of it. The pig has been standing in the
doorway for a fewminutes, and the person is looking at it very afraid, and
the pig won't move away from the door, and he (she) is afraid the pig will
bite him (her).
The results that Ekman and Friesen recorded conﬁrm that basic emotions
have universal facial expressions. Here are the results they obtained for adult
participants.
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Figure 1: Adult Results
Here are the results they obtained for child participants.
Figure 2: Child Results
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The accuracy rate is striking for both adults and children. For example, in Table
1 we see that when happiness is the correct emotion accompanied by surprise
and disgust, 90% of 62 participants chose correctly. Moreover, the results are
signiﬁcant at p < 0.01. The results for children are even more accurate. Partici-
pants did have some diﬃculty in distinguishing fear from surprise aswe can see
in the bottom three rows. For example, the accuracy rate of the 57 participants
that were shown fear (correct), surprise, and sadness was 28%. Finally, Ekman
and Friesen note the universality of facial expressions might be due to "evolu-
tion, innate neural programs, or learning experiences common tohumandevel-
opment" (128). Subsequently, 26 studies have replicated Ekman and Friesen's
ﬁndings in diﬀerent human societies (Matsumoto et al., 2008).
It is plausible that there are basic emotions including fear, surprise, anger,
sadness, happiness, disgust, and possibly contempt. These emotions are in-
dividuated as "aﬀect programs" since they have distinctive appraisals, physio-
logical changes, behavioral tendencies, and facial expressions. These features
causal covary. Thus, we have an HPC kind sadness whose real essence is the
emotion and its nominal essence includes the distinctive facial expressionmen-
tioned above. Facial expressions causally covary with their associated basic
emotion. Here I am in eﬀect borrowing from the excellent analysis provided
by Griﬃths (1997).
Figure 3: Basic emotions, facial expressions and HPC kinds
We can visualize this Boydian view by considering the close overlap between
three Venn diagrams including our species, basic emotions, and facial expres-
sions. This overlap illustrates the covariation between these three sets.
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3.2 Inbreeding avoidance and incest taboos
In this section, I will consider the distribution of inbreeding avoidance in pri-
mate species and the distribution of incest taboos across human societies. An-
thropologists distinguish between inbreeding and incest since the former is a
biological process whereas the latter is a normative one. Primatologist Anne
Pusey (1996) has collated studies of inbreeding avoidance in diﬀerent primate
species and so will begin with her ﬁndings.
Consider the following table.
Figure 4: Avoidance of sexual activity with relatives
As we can see, a + represents inhibition of mating, – represents there is no in-
hibition, +/– means that it sometimes occurs and sometimes not, and an ab-
sence of any sign means there is too little data. Consider vervet monkeys and
macaques. Males of the species are inhibited from mating with their moth-
ers, maternal siblings and other maternal relatives. Likewise, in chimpanzees,
males are inhibited frommatingwith their mothers andmaterial siblings. Thus,
non-human primates exhibit inbreeding avoidance. Amongst the male chim-
panzees studied at Gombe, males will attempt to copulate with their mothers
and sisters before reaching puberty.
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Figure 5: Copulation of male chimpanzees with mothers and sisters
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However, by age 7, the inhibition reaches 100%. Thus, inbreeding avoidance is
exhibited by many diﬀerent primate species.
In many primate species, kinship is not obvious since one is raised by many
females. How do they recognize kin? Biologists propose two mechanisms for
kin recognition in primates: phenotype matching associated with the major
histocompatibility complex (MHC) and familiarity or what is called the "Wester-
marck eﬀect." Inmice, biologists have found thatMHC leads to diﬀerent odors in
urine. Thus, by comparing the smell of one's own and another's urine, a mouse
can discriminate between relatives. EdvardWestermarck was a Finnish sociolo-
gist who taught himself English to read Charle Darwin and Thomas Hunt Mor-
gan. His theory has several components. First, a sexual aversion tends to de-
velop between those raised together in early childhood. Second, this sexual
aversion is an adaptation to avoiding inbreeding depression. Third, this sexual
aversion causes the incest taboo.
Anthropologist Arthur Wolf (2005; 2014) has argued at length that Wester-
marck's theory applies to our species. Here are two studies that lend support
to Westermarck's claims. In Taiwan/China, there existed two types of marriage,
major and minor marriage. In major marriage, when a male reached puberty,
a female was chosen who would move into the future groom's parental home.
In minor marriage, a infant girl would be raised in the future groom's parental
home as a the future daughter-in-law of a male infant. Thus, they are raised to-
gether as infants tobe amarried couple. Wolf provides data that rates of divorce
and inﬁdelity were increased inminormarriages compared tomajormarriages.
Additionally, he argued that rates of fertility declinewith regard tominor versus
major marriages. Wolf deﬁnes general fertility as,
Births to women aged 15-45
Years of marriage between these ages
Then we can see the earlier ﬁrst association between future husband and wife,
general fertility decreases.
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Figure 6: General fertility in minor marriages
A second supporting example Wolf has used comes from Shepher's (1971)
kibbutzim study. 65 unrelated children were raised in similar-age peer groups
from birth to age 18. Remarkably, there were no cases of heterosexual activity
between adolescents of the same peer group, no cases of marriage between
members of the same peer group, and there was no overt pressure to avoid
sexual activity. Of 2,769marriages, there is no instance of inter-peer groupmar-
riage. Importantly, Hartung (1985) criticized Shepher's study because it only
considered marriages in peer-groups and not across them. Hartung reasoned
thatwomenoftenmarrymen in diﬀerent peer groups. When one considers this
diﬀerence, one ﬁnds 253 marriages between individuals in the kibbutzim.
We have seen that the inbreeding avoidance is not unique to humans, but is
found in many other primate species. Thus, inbreeding avoidance cannot be a
component of an HPC kind associated with human nature. However, we might
still argue that incest taboos are. We can deﬁne an incest taboo as a prohibition
of sexual relations between certain categories of kinship. Anthropologists have
thought incest taboos are extremely important to what it is to be human. Lévi-
Stauss writes,
If social organization had a beginning, this could only have con-
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sisted in the incest prohibition, it is there, and only there, that we
ﬁnd a passage from nature to culture, from animal to human life.
(Lévi-Strauss, 1956, 278)
His view was that incest taboos marked what it means to be human because
through them we resisted our animal nature. Culture liberates us from our bi-
ology.¹¹ He, along with others, were proponents of alternative cultural theories
including the alliance theory, which claims that incest taboos ensure exogamy
or interfamilial alliances.
It is striking how much variation exists with regard to incest taboos. First,
there are many societies without such taboos. Second, where they exist, they
vary a great deal as to who is kin. In a famous study by Goggin and Sturtevant
(1964), they used the Human Relations Area Files to determine which if any hu-
man societies lacked incest taboos. They found 34 societieswhich practiced full
and half sibling incest including:
• All: Aleut, Caingang, Edo, RomanEgyptians, Fulani, Hoklo, Ancient Japanese,
Tontemboan
• Some (Full): Balinese, Guanche, Hawaiians, Inca, Malagay, Mixtec
• Some (Half ): Burmese, Cambodian, Chaga, Ancient Egyptians, Fon, Ganda,
Javanese, Kwakiutl, Lozi, Luba, Lunda,Monomotapa, Nyanga, Nyoro,Otomi,
Shilluk, Thai, Zande
¹¹In the early twentieth century,many social scientists assumedmembers of the nuclear fam-
ily were sexually attracted to one another. Freud certainly thought this in his Totem and Taboo
(1938). In fact, James Frazer, author of The Golden Bough, objected to Westermarck's theory
saying,
The law only forbids men to do what their instincts incline them to do; what na-
ture itself prohibits and punishes, it would be superﬂuous for the law to prohibit
and punish. (Frazer, 1910, 98-9)
Westermarck responded,
Would he maintain that there can be no general aversion to bestiality because
bestiality is forbidden by law, and that the exceptional severity with which parri-
cide is treated bymany law-books proves that a large number of men have a nat-
ural propensity to kill their parents? The law expresses the general feelings of the
community and punishes acts that shock them, but it does not tell us whether an
inclination to commit the forbidden act is felt by many or by few. (Westermarck,
1921, 203-4)
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To better understandwhat they found, let's consider a few of these societies
in greater detail.
UnderRoman rule and from1-300CE, Egyptianswere required toparticipate
in a census every 14 years providing household names, ages and kinship. Of
millions of these records collected, 300 survived. They show of 121 marriages
documented, 20 are between full siblings and 4 between half siblings; other
documents contain 13more siblingmarriages. What is remarkable about these
marriages is that they were publicly announced with no apparent shame.
The Greeks write regarding pre-Islamic Iran (Sansanian Empire 224-651 CE)
(Slotkin, 1947, 612-3),
...he says that theMagi cohabit with their mothers and their daugh-
ters, and according to law have intercourse with sisters; and also
that the wives sisters; and also that the wives are common, not by
violence and stealth, but bymutual agreement, when one wants to
marry the wife of another.
...they [theMagi] seeno impiety inmarriagewithamotherordaugh-
ter.
From the unholy commerce of Gellius and his mother let a Magian
by born to learn the Persian art of soothsaying; for a Magian must
be the oﬀspring of mother and son, if the unnatural religion of the
Persian is true, so that their childmayworship the godswith accept-
able hymns, whilst melting the fat caul in the altar ﬂame.
...theseMagi, by ancestral custom, consort evenwith their mothers.
Alcibiades lay with his mother, his daughter, and his sister, as Per-
sians do.
Persians have illicit intercourse with their mothers.
...the Persianmagnatesmarry theirmothers and regard the children
of the marriage as nobles of the highest birth, worthy, so it is said,
to hold the supreme sovereignty.
Alexander [theGreat]...persuaded...the Persians to reverse their oth-
ers and not to take them in wedlock.
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There are a variety of other sources but theGreeks are thought to beparticularly
reliable.
From 200 BCE until the 20th century, the Samaritans declined and in the
1940s there were 146 individuals (Bonne-Tamir, 1980; Jamieson, 1982; Talmon,
1977). However by the 1980s there were about 250 individuals. Samaritan reli-
gion prohibits marriage outside the religion, marriages are limited to extended
family lineages, and 85% of marriages are between ﬁrst and second cousins.
Finally, E. E. Evans-Pritchard writes,
[W]hen a boy reaches puberty he may take his sister and with her
build their little hut near his mother's home and go into it with his
sister and lay her down and get on top of her--and they copulate.
(Evans-Pritchard, 1974, 107)
Russell Middleton (Middleton, 1962, 603) also notes that Azande kings mar-
ried their daughters and that father-daughter incest was common among the
Thonga.
Contrary to textbooks, incest taboos are not universal. They are absent from
many more societies than one would expect. However, even in those societies
in which they exist, they vary in many diﬀerent ways. They can diﬀer as to who
is kin, how strict the prohibition is, and what the punishment for violating the
taboo is. Let's consider just variation in one dimension -- who counts as kin.
Recall an incest taboo is a prohibition of sexual relations between certain
categories of kinship. Butwhoare kin? Some societies allow sexual relationsbe-
tween ﬁrst cousins. Some societies prohibit sexual relations up to ﬁfth cousins.
Some societies prohibitmatrilineal sexual relations but not patrilineal ones, and
vice versa. Many anthropologists have argued that the concept kinship is a so-
cial construction (Sahlins, 2013). One argument for constructivism is by consid-
ering diﬀerent systems of kinship.
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Figure 7: Diﬀerent systems of kinship (wikipedia)
In kinship diagrams, the "ego" is the focal individual, with represents females
and4 represents males, | represents descent, u represents sibling ties. In the
Hawaiian system of kinship, one's mother and mother's sister are in the same
category and one's father and father's brother are in the same category. In ef-
fect, both aremothers and fathers respectively. Additionally, the daughters and
sons of one's mother and father and their respective siblings are in same cat-
egory; they are in eﬀect your siblings. Americans typically classify kinship in
terms of the Eskimo system of kinship in which uncles, aunts, cousins, etc. are
distinguished. The Hawaiian system represents approximately one third of the
world's societieswhereas the Eskimo system represents one tenthof theworld's
societies. Now, consider an incest taboo that say one should not have sexual re-
lations with your sibling; this would look radically diﬀerent in a Hawaiian versus
an Eskimo system. Constructivism about kinship need not deny relations of de-
scent; in fact kinship is superimposed on them as in our digram. Rather, we
often choose who tomate andmarry. Norms aﬀect that choice and thus in part
determines who our kin are (Hacking, 1999).
In our ﬁrst case study, I argued that there was an HPC kind consisting in
the basic emotions and facial expressions. The former is a real essence and
the latter a nominal essence. They overlay our species quite well. But when
we consider inbreeding avoidance and incest taboos things became compli-
cated. First, inbreeding avoidance is found in many diﬀerent primate species
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(andother species aswell). Though inbreedingavoidancemight covary causally
with the Westermarck eﬀect, inbreeding avoidance simply is absent in many
societies. Second, incest taboos are absent in many societies and even where
there exist, they vary in many diﬀerent ways including who counts as kin. Thus,
there are variations in taboos that inbreeding avoidance cannot explain. Thus
there is no HPC kind associated with our species with inbreeding avoidance as
its real essence and incest taboos as its nominal essence. The former is too gen-
eral and the latter to speciﬁc. We can illustrate this by the following diagram.
Figure 8: Inbreeding avoidance, incest taboos, and HPC kinds
We can visualize a Boydian view by considering the extremely loose overlap
between threeVenndiagrams includingour species, inbreedingavoidance, and
incest taboos.
There is no Boydian HPC kind in our last case study. If we want to explain
projections and inductions regarding inbreeding avoidance we must consider
much larger groups than our species. Likewise, we wish to explain our projec-
tions and inductions regarding incest taboos where they exist, we must con-
sider very diﬀerent human societies and kinship systems.
4 Conclusion
In this essay, we considered a traditional view of natural kinds and David Hull's
critique of species as natural kinds and there being a human nature. We then
consider a liberalized account of human nature due to Edouard Machery and
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Grant Ramsey. I argued that Richard Boyd's account of HPC kinds was most
promising for developing an account of human nature. By examining two case
studies, we found whether there are HPC kinds associated with our species de-
pends on the traits chosen. Donald Brown in his Human Universals argued that
facial expressions and incest taboos were human universals. We found that in
some cases, variety is the spice of our lives.
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